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GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (7) 2014
Abstract:A recent trend in international development circles is ‘New Institutionalism’. 
In a slogan, the idea is just that good institutions matter. The slogan itself is so 
innocuous as to be hardly worth comment. But the push to improve institutional 
quality has the potential to have a much less innocuous impact on aid efforts and other 
aspects of international development. This paper provides a critical introduction to 
some of the literature on institutional quality. It looks, in particular, at an argument 
for the conclusion that making aid conditional on good institutional quality will 
promote development by reducing poverty. This paper suggests that there is little 
theoretical or empirical evidence that this kind of conditionality is good for the poor.
Keywords: Institutions, Aid, Conditionality, International Development
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Introduction
A recent trend in international development circles is ‘New Institutionalism’. 
In a slogan, the idea is just that good institutions matter. The slogan itself is so 
innocuous as to be hardly worth comment. But the push to improve institutional 
quality has the potential to have a much less innocuous impact on aid efforts 
and other aspects of international development. This paper provides a critical 
introduction to some of this literature. It looks, in particular, at an argument 
for the conclusion that making aid conditional on good institutional quality 
will promote development by reducing poverty. This paper suggests that there 
is little theoretical or empirical evidence that this kind of conditionality is 
good for the poor. It also raises what may be a general problem for theoretical 
economic arguments based on posited incentive effects. Such arguments 
require empirical substantiation (which many argue requires some previously 
substantiated theoretical framework). In making its case, this paper has 
the subsidiary aim of showing how philosophers can contribute to a largely 
neglected area of study. Most work in the philosophy of economics looks at the 
foundations of game theory and welfare economics. Philosophers have paid 
very little attention to public and development economics.1 There are many 
important policy arguments that desperately require analytic examination of the 
sort philosophers are well placed to offer.2 The next section explains the kind of 
1  There are, of course, some exceptions. See, for instance, Gillian Brock, Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Nicole Hassoun, Globalization and Global Justice: Shrinking Distance, 
Expanding Obligations (Cambridge University Press: 2012); Leif Wenar, ‘Property Rights and the Resource Curse’, 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 36/1 (2008), 2-32. For discussion of philosophical work in the public economics literature 
see, for instance, Subbu Subramanian, ‘Counting the Poor: An Elementary Difficulty in the Measurement of Poverty’, 
Economics and Philosophy 18 (2002), 277-85.
2 For examples, see ibid. 
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international development at issue in this paper and motivates the inquiry into 
New Institutional arguments about international aid. The section ‘Theoretical 
Arguments for Conditionality: Moral Hazard’ considers the main theoretical 
argument for making aid conditional on institutional quality. The section ‘The 
Empirical Evidence and Critique’ considers the empirical evidence that might 
support such conditionality. The last section concludes.
New Institutionalism and International Aid
There is no single definition of international development in the literature, but 
it is almost uncontroversial to suppose that whatever else good development 
requires, it requires poverty reduction.3 Perhaps one of the most comprehensive 
practical accounts of international development is embodied in the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs have served to coordinate the efforts of 
many different actors and provide one broadly compelling picture of what good 
development requires (or at least some conditions for good development). The 
first MDG is to reduce poverty. In recent discussions of, and resolutions regarding, 
the global development agenda post-2015, poverty reduction remains a clear 
focus.4 So, this paper will assume that good development is not just a matter of 
fostering growth. Rather, good development (and international aid that promotes 
development) should, at a minimum, help the poor. A lot of the philosophical 
work on international development would support this contention.5
Similarly, when one pays attention to the details of the regressions in economists’ 
empirical studies, it is clear that they contain many different and inconsistent 
(implicit) definitions of ‘institutional quality’. Some focus on relatively stable 
features of countries that persist over time and others focus more on the 
current policy environment. A cynic might even suggest that the ‘new’ focus on 
institutional quality is not new at all. Rather it allows economists to repackage 
old results under a new label – looking at ‘good’ policies like trade liberalization, 
3   Further, there is reason to believe that aiding countries and institutions are often committed to reducing poverty 
with their aid. The World Bank, for instance, bills itself as an institution deeply concerned about poverty and does not 
articulate or defend an alternate moral framework. The Bank says: ‘Our mission is to fight poverty with passion and 
professionalism for lasting results and to help people help themselves and their environment by providing resources, 
sharing knowledge, building capacity and forging partnerships in the public and private sectors’ (World Bank, ‘About 
Us’, [2013], http://www.worldbank.org/en/about [accessed 20 August 2013]). The International Development 
Association (IDA) website says: ‘The International Development Association (IDA) is the World Bank’s fund for the 
poorest countries’ (IDA, ‘What is IDA?’, [2013], http://www.worldbank.org/ida/ [accessed 20 June 2013]).
4  United Nations, ‘United Nations A/RES/65/1’, (October 19, 2010), www.un.org/en/mdg/summit2010/pdf/outcome_
documentN1051260.pdf (accessed 20 June 2013).
5  Peter Singer, ‘Famine Affluence and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1/1 (1972), 229-43; Onora O’Neill, 
Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986); Amartya Sen, 
Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 1999); Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: 
The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Thomas Pogge, ‘Severe Poverty as a 
Human Rights Violation’, in Thomas Pogge (ed.) Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to 
the Very Poor? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 11-53; David Crocker, The Ethics of Global Development: 
Agency, Capability, and Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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corruption, and so forth and then calling these ‘institutions’ and concluding that 
good institutions are important. This paper will, thus, suppose that institutional 
quality is a cluster concept and pay attention to the details of each study which 
argues that it is important to give aid to countries with good institutions.
Despite the fact that there are different conceptions of institutional quality in 
the literature, the new focus on institutional quality’s impact on aid may have 
a large impact on international development via its impact on poverty (and 
perhaps other things). Many countries and international institutions, including 
the World Bank, African Development Bank (ADB), the United Kingdom, and 
Canada use formulas for distributing aid that take into account institutional 
quality.6 More precisely, many states and international institutions use algorithms 
governing the amount of aid they offer to different countries that include some 
version of the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) index – a measure of institutional quality.7 Some of these measures are 
quite complicated but many, like the CPIA, consider countries’ economic, 
structural, social, and public sector policies (see the Appendix for further 
explanation of the CPIA, in particular). Consider the potential impact of World 
Bank aid alone. The International Development Association (IDA) is the part of 
the World Bank that helps the world’s poorest people, 1.5 billion of whom live on 
less than the equivalent of $2 a day. In 2008, the IDA gave Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) worth 6,689.24 million.8 It provides basic health services, 
primary education, clean water and sanitation, environmental protection, 
business support, infrastructure, and help with institutional reforms.9 So it 
really matters how this institution distributes its aid. Insofar as the concern is to 
6  African Development Bank, ‘2009 Country Policy and Institutional Assessments Questionnaire’, (2009), www.
afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/2009%20CPIA%20Questionnaire%20
%28English%29%20%28Rev%20%29%20-%20Oct%2019%202009-1.pdf (accessed 26 August 2013); Finn Tarp, ‘Aid 
and Development’, Swedish Economic Policy Review 13 (2006), 9-61.
7  Over time the CPIA has changed slightly. It used to contain 20 indicators. See, for instance, Ravi Kanbur, ‘Reforming 
the Formula: A Modest Proposal for Introducing Development Outcomes in IDA Allocation Procedures’, Cornell 
University Working Paper (2005), www.arts.cornell.edu/poverty/kanbur/IDAForm.pdf (accessed 20 June 2013). 
Other changes to the formula include the fact that capital account convertability and privatization are no longer 
included in the guidelines for good policy; see Adam Minson, ‘Dialogue on the CPIA and Aid Allocation’, The Initiative 
for Policy Dialogue Working Paper Series, (2007), Ms.
8  OECD, ‘Aid Statistics’, (2010), www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ (accessed 15 July 2013). There are many different measures 
of poverty and I discuss some different proxies below. For some work on standard measures of income poverty, see 
Subramanian (2002); Nicole Hassoun and Subbu Subramanian, ‘On Some Problems of Variable Population Poverty 
Comparisons’, UNU WIDER Working Paper 2010/71 (2010), http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-
papers/2010/en_GB/wp2010-71/ (accessed 13 May 2013). 
9  Unlike other ‘aid’, ODA does not include military aid. Rather ODA primarily includes grants and loans to developing 
countries. Here is the official definition: ‘Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with 
a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount). By convention, ODA flows comprise 
contributions of donor government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries (“bilateral ODA”) and to multilateral 
institutions. ODA receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions. Lending by 
export credit agencies—with the pure purpose of export promotion—is excluded’) International Monetary Fund [IMF], 
‘External Debt Statistics: Guide for Compilers and Users – Appendix III – Glossary’, [2003], www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/eds/Eng/Guide/index.htm [accessed 19 March 2013]). 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
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reduce poverty, it is important to consider whether or not it is a good idea to make 
aid conditional on good institutional quality. 
Perhaps one could argue that the debate about making aid conditional on good 
institutional quality is purely academic for one of two reasons. First, even those 
international institutions and states that use a metric for allocating aid that takes 
into account institutional quality often fail to actually implement these rules 
consistently. The IDA, for instance, makes many exceptions – e.g., it gives more 
aid to small island states and post-conflict countries than they should receive 
on its metric. Second, if aid were allocated according to these metrics, many 
international institutions and states giving aid would actually give more aid to 
poorer countries.
The graph below illustrates how disbursements according to the IDA allocation 
formula would be much more highly correlated with other proxies for poverty 
than actual IDA allocations or ODA in general.10 
10  The official definition of ODA is ‘Grants or loans to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA 
Recipients (developing countries) and to multilateral agencies which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with 
promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms (if a loan, 
having a grant element of at least 25 percent). In addition to financial flows, technical co-operation is included in aid. 
Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g., pensions, 
reparations or insurance payouts) are in general not counted’) OECD, ‘Official Development Assistance – Definition 
and Coverage’, [2013], http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm 
[accessed 25 April 2013]).
Figure 1: Author’s Calculations of Correlation between IDA rule, IDA allocation, ODA allocation, and 
Other Proxies for Poverty
NICOLE HASSOUN
16
GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (7) 2014
If the IDA’s rule for allocating aid were actually implemented, it would ensure 
that aid goes to poorer countries on many metrics for poverty. Looking at a 
sample of 35 countries for which data is easily available, it is clear that estimated 
disbursements according to the IDA allocation rule would be highly correlated 
with child mortality, malnutrition, lack of primary education, and adult illiteracy 
rates as well as poverty rates.11 
It is not clear, however, that allocation rules’ justifications are unimportant 
– the IDA’s rule, for instance, does seem to govern the disbursement of much 
international aid. Moreover, the correlation between poverty (etc.) and 
disbursements according to allocation rules in no way justifies these rules. 
Giving aid in these ways may still do little to alleviate poverty or secure 
international development. There may be other rules that would be better for 
achieving this objective. Just like giving money to someone who is sick or who 
is doing poorly in school might not be the best way to help them get better or 
improve their grades, giving aid to poor countries may not be the best way to 
help them reduce poverty. At least this correlation cannot justify any kind of 
institutionalism.12 So it is worth seeing if, taking into account the incentives 
aid creates, a case can be made for making aid conditional on good institutional 
quality.
The rest of this paper suggests that, insofar as aid is supposed to relieve poverty, 
there is little reason to believe we should make aid conditional on good institutional 
quality. The next section considers the main theoretical argument put forward for 
using aid allocation metrics that put a lot of emphasis on institutional quality. 
The fourth section turns to some of the evidence regarding the impact on poverty 
of making aid conditional on good institutional quality.
Theoretical Arguments for Conditionality: Moral Hazard
Perhaps the best theoretical argument for making aid conditional on good 
institutional quality is the moral hazard argument. There are many different 
version of the moral hazard argument that posit different mechanisms by which 
giving aid on the basis of poverty alone creates potentially counter-productive 
incentives. It is only necessary to consider, however, a version that the IDA seems 
to embrace when it says: ‘While it is natural to focus on how the allocation formula 
distributes aid across poor countries, it should be kept in mind that it also affects 
11  Author’s calculations using the 2004 IDA disbursement formula and looking just at the subset of countries for which 
data was available from the following sources: Bob Baulch, ‘Aid Distribution and the MDGs’, World Development 34/6 
(2006), 933-50; United Nations Development Programme, ‘Human Development Report 2010’, (2010), http://hdr.
undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/270/hdr_2010_en_complete_reprint.pdf (accessed 15 May 2013). 
12  Moreover, this correlation may not be enough to justify any of these rules. Giving to the poorest countries, on any of 
these measures, might not be the best way to reduce poverty for reasons other than the idea that we have to take into 
account institutional quality to reduce poverty.
INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
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how poor countries are treated over time. The negative coefficient on per capita 
GNI (Gross National Income) is essentially a tax on growth’.13 The problem this 
paper will suggest moral hazard arguments have is quite general – empirical 
evidence is necessary to support their claims about incentives. 
In the moral hazard argument at issue, the main claim is not that if we give 
to countries that are poor, simply because they are poor, rulers will keep their 
countries poor. The claim is that if we give to countries that are poor, simply 
because they are poor, we create an incentive for rulers to keep their countries 
poor. An incentive, at least as most economists use the term, just provides a reason 
for action. An incentive is like a reward or penalty. Rewards or penalties may or 
may not be efficacious. Sometimes incentives do not work. Nevertheless, many 
incentives have motivational force. The version of the moral hazard argument 
above says that if we give to countries that are poor, simply because they are poor, 
we give rulers a reason to keep their countries poor – they can get more aid. So we 
should not just give to poor countries, we should instead give to poor countries 
that have good policies. 
Consider an analogy that illustrates the problem with this argument – a variation 
of philosopher Peter Singer’s famous pond case. Suppose that, on your way to 
work, you see a small child is drowning in a pond. You can save the child by a 
process that involves giving the child’s mother one hundred dollars. Even though 
it will cost you something to do so, if no one else can help the child and the child 
will otherwise drown, it is clear that you should save the child. Some have pointed 
out that if you save the child, you create incentives for mothers of small children 
to throw their children into ponds. The proper reply to this kind of case is that 
there is no reason to think other mothers (generally) will throw their children in 
ponds for one hundred dollars even in places where one hundred dollars is a lot 
of money. Sometimes, we should (simply) aim to ameliorate poverty even if we 
create bad incentives in the process. 
The moral hazard argument may not always be dismissed so easily. In some 
cases, there may be reason to think many mothers will do things to harm 
their children if we create incentives for them to do so. After all, some parents 
probably do maim their children so as to make them better beggars.14 It is less 
clear that this is because people will help those who are maimed. This may not 
13  IDA, ‘IDA 14: IDA’s Performance Based Allocation’, (2004), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/
PBAIDA14.pdf (accessed 7 June 2013), p. 7. The IDA actually tries to give poverty some weight in its allocation rule in 
this way but the general point is that if we give to poorer countries aid, it will be negatively correlated with growth and 
thus create a disincentive for growth. For criticism of the IDA’s attempt to take into account poverty in the way that 
it does, see Nicole Hassoun, ‘World Bank Rules for Aid Allocation: Moral Hazard?’ in Helen Stacy and Win-chiat Lee 
(eds.), Economic Justice (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012b), 221-41.
14  The moral import of this observation is less clear.
NICOLE HASSOUN
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be the best explanation of why mothers might harm their children. A better 
explanation is that mothers maim their children only because they do not have a 
better means for helping their families survive.
In any case, the claim that we should not create incentives for some to keep 
others in poverty requires defense. Consider an expansion of the (first part of the 
relevant version of) the moral hazard argument:
P1) If we give to countries that are poor, simply because they are poor, 
we create an incentive for their rulers to keep them poor. 
P2) We should not create an incentive for rulers to keep their countries 
poor.
C) We should not give to countries that are poor, simply because they 
are poor.
The complaint is that we need some reason to accept the second premise, 
for it is not always true. Rulers may not act on the incentive aid creates. Giving 
to countries with good institutions may not increase growth or spur poverty 
reduction. 
More generally, we may be wrong about the efficacy of any posited incentive 
effect. Other incentive effects may be present and counter the posited effect or the 
posited effect may fail to generate action. Consider an example from a different 
domain. Many people believe that decreasing what people are paid gives them 
an incentive to work less hard. Few seem to recognize, however, that decreasing 
what people are paid also gives them an incentive to work harder (to make up 
for lost income).15 If some people need very little money (e.g., because they are 
primarily sustenance farmers), decreasing what they are paid may not influence 
their behavior at all.
Another problem with many versions of the moral hazard argument is this: 
Even if aiding on the basis of poverty alone creates some efficacious incentives 
for rulers to keep their countries poor, we may still have to aid on the basis of 
poverty alone in some circumstances. Suppose that some countries will not 
escape poverty on their own and aid may do them very little good. Their leaders 
may keep them poor in order to receive more aid. Suppose, further, that there is 
no other way to aid. It may, for instance, be impossible to tell which countries will 
continue to support themselves after receiving aid and which will remain poor. 
Further, there may be very few countries that will remain poor and many that 
will escape poverty permanently. In this kind of case, it is not clearly acceptable 
15  For an exception, see Robert Goodin, Reasons for Welfare: The Political Theory of the Welfare State (Princeton 
University Press: Princeton, 1988).
INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
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to stop giving aid. We may have to give aid even if aid creates some efficacious 
incentives for some rulers to keep their countries poor.
Nevertheless, there may be something important underlying the moral hazard 
argument. Consider just one revised version of this argument that avoids the 
problems outlined above: Giving on the basis of poverty alone creates an efficacious 
incentive for rulers to keep their countries poor. When we justifiably have some 
concern for how much poverty we alleviate (etc.), other criteria should enter into 
our decisions about how to aid.16 This argument is much more promising than the 
original moral hazard argument because it appeals only to efficacious incentive 
effects. Further, it does not rely on the controversial claim that we need never aid 
desperately poor countries when some will remain poor because of the incentives 
aid creates. 
Even the revised version of the moral hazard argument gives nothing like the 
kind of justification necessary for distributing aid only to countries with good 
institutional quality. For the revised version of the moral hazard argument to 
be well-justified, the premise that aiding on the basis of poverty alone creates an 
efficacious incentive for rulers to keep their countries poor requires empirical 
defense.17 
Finally, even if some of the negative incentives aid creates do drive behavior, 
what we should do about that is still an open question. Even if giving aid to poor 
16  This may be so, for instance, if resources are so scarce that we are unable to eliminate poverty and do all of the other 
things that matter. This is not clearly the case in the actual world, however. For, (1) we give very little aid globally and 
(2) we know a lot about what makes aid work. It is well-known that most countries fall far short of the target of .7 
percent of GDP in foreign aid (OECD, ‘Development Aid at its Highest Level Ever in 2008’, [2008], www.oecd.org/do
cument/35/0,3343,en_2649_34487_42458595_1_1_1_1,00.html [accessed on 28 June 2013]). On average, citizens 
in OECD-DAC countries gave $68 in 2002 (OECD [2004] cited in Tarp [2006], p. 14). Furthermore, there is a lot of 
good evidence that some aid works. There are many experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations of health and 
education programs, for instance, that demonstrate their success. There are also good examples of agricultural support, 
microfinance, school voucher, scholarship, and de-worming programs. See Nava Ashraf, Dean Karlan, and Wesley 
Yin, ‘Female Empowerment: Impact of a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines’, World Development, 38/3 
(2010), 333-344; Robert Cassen, Does Aid Work? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Jonathan Isham, Deepa Narayan, 
and Lant Pritchett, ‘Does Participation Improve Project Performance: Establishing Causality with Subjective Data’, 
The World Bank Economic Review 9/2 (1995), 175-200; Al Kehler, ‘When Will Ethiopia Stop Asking for Food Aid?’, in 
Humanitarian Policy Group (ed.), Humanitarian Exchange. Humanitarian Policy Group No. 27  (London: Overseas 
Development Institute, 2004), 22-4; Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Michael Kremer, ‘Using Randomization 
in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit’, Center for Economic Policy Research Working Paper 6059 (2007). 
Many of these programs have been successfully replicated and scaled up (Duflo et al. [2007]; Hassan Zaman, 
‘Poverty and BRAC’s Microcredit Programme: Exploring Some Linkages’, BRAC Working Paper Number 18 [1997]; 
Jonathan Morduch, ‘Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor? New Evidence from Flagship Programs in Bangladesh’, 
Harvard University Department of Economics and HIID Working Paper [1998] http://www.cgdev.org/doc/RM/
Morduch%201998,%20Does%20Microfinance%20Really%20Help%20the%20Poor--New%20Evidence%20
from%20Flagship%20Programs%20in%20Bangladesh.pdf [accessed 16 July 2013]; Mark Pitt, ‘Reply to Jonathan 
Morduch’s ‘Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor? New Evidence from Flagship Programs in Bangladesh’, Ms., 
http://www.brown.edu/research/projects/pitt/sites/brown.edu.research.projects.pitt/files/uploads/reply_0.pdf 
[accessed 20 August 2013]). Though it may not be easy to do so, it is clearly possible to create such programs.
17  There may be other arguments for considering other factors besides development or poverty in aid allocation. We might 
be concerned, for instance, about how fast we can alleviate poverty. This paper will not explore other possibilities. See, 
however, Deen Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Hassoun 
and Subramanian (2010).
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countries on the basis of poverty alone creates an efficacious incentive for their 
rulers to keep them poor and concern with how much poverty we alleviate (etc.) 
is justified, it does not follow that we should give to those countries with good 
institutions. For it is possible that giving to countries with good institutions would 
be no better, or even worse, for the poor than giving on the basis of poverty alone. 
It is time to turn to the empirical evidence for the conclusion that institutional 
quality matters. If it is not sustainable, there is reason to endorse a different 
theoretical framework in the search for reflective equilibrium between theory and 
practice. Before considering this evidence, it is worth noting that the problem with 
the moral hazard argument may be a general problem for theoretical economic 
arguments based on posited incentive effects. Such arguments require empirical 
substantiation.18 
The Empirical Evidence and Critique
Before considering more sophisticated empirical arguments, consider why we 
cannot conclude that we should make aid conditional on countries having good 
institutions because institutions are good for poverty reduction.19 Most of the 
literature on the importance of institutional quality focuses on establishing 
that good institutions foster growth.20 But we cannot rely on estimates of how 
much growth, in general, reduces poverty to bridge the gap in figuring out how 
institutions impact poverty (even if they increase growth). Not all causes of growth 
will reduce poverty by the same amount – some may even increase poverty.21 
18  Some argue that this requires some previously substantiated theoretical framework. See for instance,, Angus Deaton, 
‘Instruments of Development: Randomization in the Tropics, and the Search for the Elusive Keys to Economic 
Development’, NBER Working Paper 14690 (2009), www.econ.uiuc.edu/~roger/courses/574/readings/Deaton_
Instruments%20of%20development.pdf (accessed 16 April 2013).
19  For some seminal work in New Institutional Economics see Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and 
Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). In this book North argues that institutions are 
incredibly important for international development as they help create order and reduce transaction costs. However, 
he provides no empirical evidence to make his case. North instead surveys the history of economic development in 
several countries and gives informal game-theoretic arguments. Although North’s article opened the door to empirical 
research on this important topic, it does little on its own to establish his empirical conclusions about the importance 
of goods institutions.
20  One key paper supporting the institutional thesis popularized, in part, by Daren Acemoglu and James Robinson’s book 
Why Nations Fail (New York: Crown Business Publishing, 2012), is Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James 
Robinson, ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development’, The American Economic Review 91 (2001), 1369–401. 
In this paper, Acemoglu et al. implemented (a now widely used method) of dealing with what economists call an 
‘endogeneity’ problem – roughly, the problem that arises when we do not take into account the impact of reverse 
causation. One way to deal with this problem is to introduce an ‘instrument’ – something that is correlated with the 
right-hand side variable (the hypothesized causal factor – in this case institutional quality) - but should be independent 
of the left-hand side variable (that is of interest – here, growth). In order to identify the instrument for the quality of 
institutions, Acemoglu et al. look at differences in settler mortality during colonial time. It seems, however, that more 
than a modicum of faith is necessary to accept arguments based on this instrument for institutional quality. Acemoglu 
et al.’s instrument might be good for colonialism (or successful colonialism) but it does not clearly capture any kind of 
institutional quality. 
21  Fernando Teson, ‘When Philosophers Misdiagnose’,  Analysis 74/1 (2014), 107-18. There may also be another problem 
with the literature on institutional quality. The proposition that ‘institutions matter’ is compelling (who would doubt 
this? – especially if, as Teson suggests, ‘[g]ood governance may be roughly defined as the traditions and institutions 
by which authority in a country is exercised to the benefit of its citizens’) (Teson [2014], p. 112). Nevertheless, when 
one pays attention to the details of the regressions in economists’ empirical studies, it is clear that they contain many 
different and inconsistent (implicit) definitions of institutional quality. 
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A few papers do look at the impact of institutional quality on poverty specifically.22 
However, the evidence that good institutions are good for poverty reduction may 
have some problems in dealing with reverse causality.23 
Moreover, even if the claim that good institutions are good for poverty reduction 
is correct, further evidence is necessary to establish that aiding countries with 
good institutions will ameliorate poverty. Even if aid improves institutional 
quality, some causes of institutional improvement may not contribute to poverty 
relief. Alternately, aid may not improve, it may even destroy, good institutions.24 
Mathias Risse might be right when he says that ‘the sources of wealth rest in 
[domestic] institutional quality… . While foreigners can destroy institutions, they 
can often do little to help build them’.25 The general form of argument – x reduces 
poverty so we should give to countries with x – is not a good one. It is important 
to consider whether countries, or international institutions, offering aid might do 
better to target it in other ways.26 We need to know whether aid has more impact 
in countries with good institutional quality.
There is a large body of empirical evidence that might support the claim that 
‘among low-income countries, large-scale financial aid has more impact in an 
environment of sound institutions and policies’.27 Perhaps the seminal article on 
the topic is ‘Aid, Policies, and Growth’ (first put out as a working paper in 1997) 
by Burnside and Dollar. This paper argues that aid works only in countries with 
‘good policies’ using a measure of policy quality that contains budget surplus, 
trade openness and inflation weighted by their correlation with growth rates.28 
22  See, for instance, Omar Azfar, ‘Institutions and Poverty Reduction’, Center for Institutional Reform and the 
Informal Sector (IRIS), University of Maryland, College Park, (2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPGI/
Resources/342674-1115051862644/Institutions8.pdf (accessed 23 April 2013).
23  In the paper cited above, for instance, institutional quality is not a significant predictor of growth on the standard 
instrument for institutional quality (moreover, I do not find this instrumentation strategy compelling – see discussion 
in notes below). 
24  Aid may help countries with bad institutions improve their institutions and reduce poverty
25  Mathias Risse, ‘Do We Owe the Poor Assistance or Rectification?’ Ethics & International Affairs 19/1 (2005), 9-18.
26  Even if the institutionalist thesis is true, it is so vague as to be unhelpful. It is not clear what components of institutional 
quality as measured by the CPIA index, for instance, are contributing to aid’s success (see Dani Rodrik, ‘Getting 
Institutions Right’, [2004], http://www.cesifo-group.de/pls/guestci/download/CESifo+DICE+Report+2004/
CESifo+DICE+Report+2/2004/dicereport204-forum2.pdf [accessed April 23 2013]. Very different institutional 
systems can also receive high ratings on different indexes. Even a legal system based on private property is not 
necessary for high ratings (e.g., China seems to do pretty well on some ratings). Some commentators argue against 
having a single formula for aid disbursement at all - context matters, there is no one-size fits all approach. Perhaps 
we should look for contingent correlations between local economic conditions and success (Rodrik [2004], p. 9). Still, 
there should be a point to saying ‘institutions rule’. 
27  IDA (2004), p. 6; Craig Burnside and David Dollar, ‘Aid, Policies, and Growth’, American Economic Review, 90/4 
(2000), 847-68; Craig Burnside and David Dollar, ‘Aid, Policies, and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence’, World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 2834 (2004); David Dollar and Victoria Levin, ‘Increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 
1984-2002’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3299 (2004); Paul Collier and David Dollar, ‘Aid Allocation 
and Poverty Reduction’, European Economic Review 46/8 (2002), 1475-500.
28  Burnside and Dollar (2000). This research was also picked up by the World Bank report by David Dollar and Lant 
Pritchett, ‘Assessing Aid- What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why’, (1998), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/1998/11/438890/assessing-aid-works-doesnt (accessed 5 June 2013) and Collier and Dollar (2002) have taken 
on leadership roles within the Bank’s research department, greatly influencing public opinion and probably economic 
policy (William Easterly, ‘How the Millennium Development Goals are Unfair to Africa’, World Development 37/1 
[2009], 26-35).
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Collier and Dollar and Burnside and Dollar extended this work using other 
measures of institutional quality including the CPIA index.29 
Unfortunately, the Burnside and Dollar study has been roundly criticized, and its 
successors suffer from many of the same problems.30 These problems undermine 
the evidence that distributing aid to countries on the basis of institutional quality 
is an effective way to increase growth rates. Many researchers have had trouble 
replicating the results in Burnside and Dollar’s study and its successors.31 The 
results are, at least, quite fragile; they depend greatly on the particular theoretical 
assumptions (model specification) and data used.32 The studies at issue may well 
have endogeniety problems and aid may not have a linear relationship to growth 
(though the studies suppose otherwise).33 Some of the studies depend on a few 
crucial (country and year) observations.34 
Some researchers also question the general thesis that aid is more effective 
in good institutional environments. Some suggest that good institutions are not 
a precondition for aid to work, though good institutions increase aid’s impact 
on growth.35 Others argue that features of countries besides their institutional 
quality, like climate, may explain why aid works in some places but not others.36 
Some even find that good institutions may hinder aid’s effectiveness.37
Both Burnside and Dollar and Dollar and Levin try to defend the evidence in 
favor of aiding countries with good institutions.38  They point out that ‘common to 
many of these criticisms is a change in specification, either in terms of estimation 
technique, or in terms of which variables are included in the regression’.39 But 
one complaint about Burnside, Dollar, and Levin’s studies was precisely that 
29  Collier and Dollar (2002) and Craig Burnside and David Dollar, ‘Aid, Policies, and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence’, 
World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2834 (2004). There are many worries about this and the other 
measures of institutional quality researchers use, but this paper will set aside any problems with the measures of 
institutional quality in the studies for now. For discussion of the CPIA index, in particular, see Hassoun (2012b).
30  Robert Lensink and Howard White, ‘Are There Negative Returns to Aid?’, (1999), http://som.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/FILES/
reports/1995-1999/themeE/1999/99E60/99e60.pdf (accessed 20 July 2013); Carl-Johan Dalgaard and Henrik 
Hansen, ‘On Aid, Growth, and Good Policies’, CREDIT Research Paper 00/17 (2000), http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/
saber/ead_53.pdf (accessed 17 June 2013); Carl-Johan Dalgaard, Henrik Hansen, and Finn Tarp, ‘On The Empirics of 
Foreign Aid and Growth’, The Economic Journal 114 (2004), 191-216.
31  Lensink and White (1999); Shuans Lu and Rati Ram, ‘Foreign Aid, Government Policies, and Economic Growth: 
Further Evidence from Cross-Country Panel Data for 1970-1993’, International Economics 54/1 (2001), 15-29.
32  Lu and Ram (2001); Dalgaard and Hansen (2000).
33  Deaton (2009); Dalgaard and Hansen (2000); Channing Arndt, Sam Jones and Finn Tarp, ‘Aid and Growth’, UNU-
WIDER Discussion Paper 2009/05 (2009).
34  William Easterly, Ross Levine, and David Roodman, ‘New Data, New Doubts: Revisiting “Aid, Policies, and Growth”’, 
Center for Global Development Working Paper Number 26, www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/2764_file_cgd_
wp026.pdf (accessed 17 August 2013).
35  Dalgaard and Hansen (2000).
36  Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004).
37 Dalgaard and Hansen (2000).
38  Ibid.
39  Dollar and Levin (2004), p. 2; Burnside and Dollar (2004), p. 6.
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they use the wrong theoretical specification. As to data sources, Dollar and Levin 
admit that it was, for a long time, literally impossible for other researchers to 
access their data.40 What Dollar et al. do not mention is that this is because the 
World Bank’s research department, in which Dollar and Collier have both taken 
leadership positions, had not released it. Furthermore, even when researchers 
were eventually given access to the original data, they were unable to replicate the 
results.41 So there is little reason to believe these studies’ conclusions. 
An equally important critique, however, is that the main studies supporting 
Burnside and Dollar’s results use GDP per capita as a measure of poverty. At 
best there is a large gap between the studies’ results and the claim that a metric 
for allocating aid that makes aid conditional on good institutional quality is 
justified because it reduces poverty. Consider Dollar and Collier’s argument that 
increasing the weight given to poorer countries in the IDA’s formula will reduce 
aid’s effectiveness in ameliorating poverty. They suggest that the  ‘poverty efficient’ 
allocation of aid rises with GNI per capita to about $800 in part because relatively 
richer poor countries are better able to absorb aid.42 However, to estimate the 
‘poverty efficient’ allocation, the authors of this study – Paul Collier and David 
Dollar – assume that growth will reduce poverty by a certain amount and that 
there is a set budget for reducing poverty. Neither of these claims is well justified. 
They simply assume, for instance, that the effect of aid is distributionally neutral 
and then adopt an estimate of the poverty elasticity of growth given mean income 
based on a few research papers.43 The papers they rely upon look at the general 
impact of growth on poverty, however, not on the impact of aid-induced growth 
on poverty which, as noted above, may be a quite different matter. Although the 
debate will surely continue, the evidence that making aid to countries conditional 
on their having good institutions will better reduce poverty is not compelling.
Conclusion
This paper provided a critical introduction to some of the literature on institutional 
quality and international development. It looked, in particular, at an argument 
for the conclusion that making aid conditional on good institutional quality 
will promote development by reducing poverty. It suggested that there is little 
evidence that this kind of conditionality is good for the poor. Even if institutional 
quality turns out to be an important determinant of aid’s efficacy, however, many 
other things besides good institutions may contribute to aid’s ability to reduce 
poverty.44 Moreover, even though it would be incredibly surprising if good 
40  Dollar and Levin (2004).
41  Dalgaard and Hansen (2000). 
42  Collier and Dollar (2002).
43  Ibid., pp. 17-8.
44  For instance, see Jeffrey Sachs, Andrew Mellinger, and John Gallup, ‘The Geography of Poverty and Wealth’, Scientific 
American 284 (2001), 70-5. 
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institutions – under some definition – were not important for good development, 
there are strong arguments that other things matter as well. So the take-home 
lesson is not that good institutions do not matter – but just that we need to think 
carefully about how we can better make the case that they matter. We should also 
look closely at the ways that good institutions do and do not matter in trying to 
promote international development. 
More generally, this paper aimed to illustrate a new way that philosophers 
might contribute to the philosophy of economics. Philosophers of economics 
have so far focused on the foundations of welfare economics – evaluating the 
coherence and plausibility of the assumptions underlying much theoretical work 
in the discipline. There are, however, many important discussions in economics’ 
sub-disciplines, including development economics, to which philosophers can 
fruitfully contribute.45
45  This paper draws largely on my paper ‘World Bank Rules for Aid Allocation’ presented at the AMINTAPHIL conference 
on economic justice and subsequently published in their conference proceedings. I would like to thank the editors for 
permission to publish a revised version of the paper here as well as those who kindly provided comments on drafts of 
that paper.
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Appendix: The IDA’s Formula for Aid Allocation and the CPIA Index 
Very roughly,46 the IDA’s Formula for Aid Allocation is this: 
f (PR2.0, GNIPC-0.125)
GNIPC stands for Gross National Product Per Capita. The IDA gives less weight to 
GNIPC as it rises so that each increment of income yields less aid.47 PR stands for 
Performance Rating and the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment index 
(CPIA) makes up 80% of the PR. The Annual Review of Portfolio Performance 
(ARPP), the Bank’s rating of projects in a country, makes up the remaining 
20%.48 This sum is then scaled by a measure of countries’ governance quality. 
This measure is taken from the six governance criteria in the CPIA and one in the 
ARPP (weighted equally, divided by 3.549 and raised to the power of 1.5). In effect, 
governance gets a lot of weight in the formula. There are also many exceptions.50
Although the exact formula changes over time, the IDA14 formula was:
Allocation Country i (3-year) = SDR3.3 million + Performance-Based Allocation 
i (PBA i) where:
(i)  IDA Rating Country i =( 0.8 x CPIA i + 0.2 x ARPP i) x Govfact i
(ii)   Governance Factor i = (average rating of 6 governance criteria  
i / 3.5)1.5
(iii)  The Envelope = IDA three-year envelope, after deduction of the 
otherwise determined blend allocations as well as the allocations 
to eligible post-conflict countries
(iv)   The country allocation norm is subject to a maximum of $20 per 
capita per annum. 51
46  The IDA’s formula continues to evolve over time. See, for instance, IDA, ‘IDA 15: IDA’s Performance Based Allocation’, 
(2007a),   www.siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/Seminar%20PDFs/73449-1172525976405/3492866-
1172527584498/PBAformula.pdf (accessed 19 July 2013); IDA, ‘IDA 15: Selectivity and Performance’, (2007b), www.
siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/Seminar%20PDFs/73449-1172525976405/3492866-1172527584498/
PBAEffectiveness.pdf (accessed 23 July 2013).
47 Kanbur (2005), p. 11.  
48  Jeff Powell, ‘The World Bank Policy Scorecard: The New Conditionality?’ Bretton Woods Project, (2004), www.
brettonwoodsproject.org/2004/11/art-84455/ (accessed 26 September 2013).
49  CPIA scores for each criteria are between 1 (low) and 6 (high), 3.5 is the mid-point.
50  Post-conflict countries get some precedence for IDA assistance but this is not reflected in the formula itself. Since 
there is a cap on how much aid countries can receive, there is also a bias in favor of small countries not reflected in 
the formula. A few years ago the Bank reported that ‘sixty-two percent of IDA 14 resources will be allocated using 
the formula; another 14 percent go to the capped wealthier countries (India, Indonesia and Pakistan); 10 percent go 
to post-conflict countries and 8 percent go to “special purposes” agreed during the replenishment process’ (Bretton 
Woods Project, ‘The IDA replenishment’, [2007], www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-552223 [accessed 5 June 2013]). 
The fact that small countries get more than their proportionate share of assistance (Tarp [2006], p. 26) should 
probably be questioned, though this paper will not take on this task.
51 IDA (2004). 
PBA i = x Envelope
(IDA rating i)2 x Population i x (GNI/cap i)-.125
Σ i =1-81 [(IDA rating i)2 x Population i x (GNI/cap i)-.125]
NICOLE HASSOUN
26
GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (7) 2014
The CPIA index is based on a questionnaire filled out by World Bank personnel. 
It contains 16 indicators in four equally weighted groups – structural policies, 
economic management, public management and institutions, and social 
inclusion/equity policies. CPIA scores for each criteria are between 1 (low) and 
6 (high).
To come up with the ratings, evaluators rate a small number of countries in each 
region and provide narrative guidelines to country staff who then rate countries 
on each criterion. The scores are modified by the chief economists in the region. 
Sector experts review the new scores, and modifications are reviewed by the chief 
economists again. An arbitration panel resolves disputes. Below are the CPIA 
Index Rating Categories.
A. Economic management
1. Monetary and exchange rate policy 
2. Fiscal policy 
3. Debt policy
B. Structural policies
4. Trade 
5. Financial sector 
6. Business environment
C. Policies for social inclusion
7. Gender 
8. Equity of public resource use 
9. Building human resources 
10. Social protection and labor 
11. Policies and institutions for environmental sustainability
D. Public sector management and institutions
12. Property rights and rule-based governance 
13. Quality of budgetary and financial management 
14. Efficiency and equity of revenue mobilization 
15. Quality of public administration 
16. Transparency, accountability and corruption in the public sector52
Here is some further information about CPIA ‘governance criteria’ which receive 
a good deal of weight in the World Bank’s analysis of countries’ institutional 
quality:
Property rights and rules-based governance: a good score requires, 
inter alia, that property rights be protected in ‘practice as well as 
52 Excerpted from Powell (2004), Box 1.
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theory’; laws and regulations affecting businesses are ‘transparent and 
uniformly applied’; obtaining licences is a small share of the cost of 
doing business; police force functions well and is accountable.
Quality of budgetary and financial management: assesses extent 
to which budget is linked to policy priorities in national strategies; 
effective financial management; timely and accurate fiscal reporting; 
and clear and balanced assignment of expenditures and revenues to 
each level of government.
Efficiency of revenue mobilization: a good score requires that ‘bulk 
of revenues’ be generated from ‘low-distortion’ taxes such as sales/
VAT, property, etc.; low import tariffs; tax base is free from arbitrary 
exemptions.
Quality of public administration: assesses ‘policy coordination and 
responsiveness, service delivery and operational efficiency, merit and 
ethics, and pay adequacy and management of the wage bill’.
Transparency, accountability and corruption: a good score requires 
accountability reinforced by audits, inspections and adverse publicity 
for performance failures; an independent, impartial judiciary; conflict 
of interest and ethics rules for public servants.53
53 Excerpted from ibid., Box 2.
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